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ABSTRACT
Online trust systems are playing an important role in to-days
world and face various challenges in building them. Billions
of dollars of products and services are traded through elec-
tronic commerce, files are shared among large peer-to-peer
networks and smart contracts can potentially replace pa-
per contracts with digital contracts. These systems rely on
trust mechanisms in peer-to-peer networks like reputation
systems or a trustless public ledger. In most cases, reputa-
tion systems are build to determine the trustworthiness of
users and to provide incentives for users to make a fair con-
tribution to the peer-to-peer network. The main challenges
are how to set up a good trust system, how to deal with se-
curity issues and how to deal with strategic users trying to
cheat on the system. The Sybil attack, the most important
attack on reputation systems is discussed. At last match
making in two sided markets and the strategy proofness of
these markets are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION TO ONLINE TRUST SYS-
TEMS
We focus on enabling trust and transactions between peers
in a decentralized market. A decentralized market is a mar-
ket where traders directly meet each other without an inter-
mediate party like in a centralized market. Removing these
intermediaries reduces cost. Williamson (1993)[44] distin-
guishes six types of trust contexts that are important for
economic activity: societal trust, political trust, regulatory
trust, professional trust, network trust and trust in the cor-
porates themselves. As these contexts are outside of the
digital world it is hard for a computer to calculate whether
another party is trustworthy or not. The lack of social re-
lations with other traders in markets on the Internet can
create problems in communication and trust (Furlong, D.,
1996)[22]. For instance, in grain trading markets, sharing
all information gives opportunities for actors to use this in-
formation and exploit the sharing trader. A buyer in grain
trading markets might be reluctant in sharing how much
grain it wants to buy because this gives valuable informa-
tion about the trading position of the buyer. When other
actors know the trading position of the buyer they can play
economic games like only selling grain to this buyer for a
higher price.
The feeling of trust a trader has with another trader is not
purely rational. In neo-classical economics traders come to-
gether for an instant to exchange goods to maximize their
utility in the perfect market. The traders maximize their
utility by rational reason. In later research in economics
and politics, researchers came to the consensus that actors
had a bounded rationality and abandoned the idea of deci-
sions based on reason. Actors cannot oversee the choice of
possibilities and options to rationally maximize utility (Si-
mon, H.A., 1972)[57]. Economists began to think of about
other models that explain the economic behaviour of actors.
Therefore social relations and trust were introduced as con-
cepts in economic decision making research (Furlong, D.,
1996)[22].
There are examples of markets where a lot of volume is
traded via the Internet and where the trust relation appears
not to be a problem. For instance, the volume traded in
decentralized markets like used cars, used books or used fur-
niture has increased dramatically in the recent years. In the
period 1997-2007 the volume increase of used cars traded in-
creased by 7.2 procent in California. This implies a welfare
gain of $43 million per year relative to 1997 in California
alone. Internet allows targeted search in niche markets like
used automobiles. Information about the product is shared
free of charge to all potential buyers. The geographical reach
that Internet provides to potential buyers is the main reason
for the success of such markets. Also, the transaction cost
of a trade decreases in Internet based decentralized markets
compared to centralized markets. Transactions costs are the
costs of finding the right information, bargaining costs and
contract costs. (Rapson and Schiraldi, 2013)[12]. What kind
of information and how information should be presented to
users depend on the structure of the market. In the survey
multiple types of markets are researched, each with their
own characteristics. [34] [64]
2. OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS
Online markets started 22 years ago. Numerous examples
exist which reached large-scale usage. Such operational sys-
tems provide solid proof for our design space.
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2.1 Decentralized markets
Pierre Omidyar first started the peer-to-peer decentralized
market eBay when he put a broken laser pointer for sale
and sold it for $14.83. eBay allows buyers to buy all sorts of
goods online from sellers throughout the world. Other mar-
kets like computer programming (Freelancer, oDesk), con-
sumer loans (Prosper, Lending Club), crafts (Etsy), start-
up financing (Kickstarter), accommodation (Airbnb), baby-
sitting (Care.com), currency exchange (Transferwise, Cur-
rencyFair) and on demand rides (Uber, Lyft, Blabla Car).
They match buyers and sellers or implement an auction-
based pricing. In 1995 people still were reluctant to send
money across the country to an anonymous seller for a prod-
uct on eBay. [17] [46] [31]
Trust is vital for commerce. The electronic commerce ac-
ceptance model explains when users have the intent to go
to an electronic shop instead of a real physical one. It turns
out that not only the information quality, service quality
and system quality have its effect on the perceived useful-
ness of the system, but also the perceived trust of an e-
commerce website plays a vital role in the perceived useful-
ness of the system and the altitude of the system. Successful
e-commerce websites ensure a low level of consumer risk per-
ception and a high level of consumer trust perception. [11]
In some markets trust is created by inspection or by exter-
nal regulations. For instance, sellers will post pictures of
the product on eBay and eBay compensates the buyer if the
seller does not deliver as advertised. The most used trust
mechanism is reputation or feedback systems: users give
feedback after the delivery of a product or service. In eBay
most bad actors and highly fraudulent behavior is filtered
out with the reputation system. [17] [50] [25]
2.2 Decentralized exchanges
Some markets have an exchange where commodities, finan-
cial products, currencies and futures are traded. Sellers pro-
vide ask prices and buyers provide bid prices. Exchanges
require a centralized component through which the products
are traded. The first attempt at a decentralized exchange
market is Tsukiji, by The,M. and Reinbergen, H. (2013). It
is a simple implementation where decentralized nodes act as
traders. The traders can place bid and ask offers and re-
spond to an offer such that a trade can be established. The
discovery of peers is also implemented but there is no real
money traded and there also isn’t a working user interface.
[40]
An improvement on the design of Tsukiji is the Decentral ex-
change market design by Olsthoorn, M.J.G. and Winter, J.
(2016). Instead of peer discovery bid and ask prices together
with quantities are distributed across the network with ticks
when a peer bids or asks a certain quantity. Secondly, there
is a simple matching engine implemented that matches bid
and ask quantity amounts with the highest and lowest prices.
Then when a match is made real money is traded. Multi-
Chain coins of Tribler peers are traded against BitCoins in
a single transaction where both wallets of both traders are
updated. The design is successfully implemented in Tribler,
constructed with Dispersy and tested. [45]
2.3 Anonymous decentralized markets
Figure 1: Decentralized exchange system by Ol-
sthoorn and Winter (2016) [45]
Figure 2: Bitcoin / Dollar exchange example down-
load from www.coinbase.com
Figure 3: Sales volume in the entire anonymous de-
centralized market ecosystem [58]
Anonymous markets make perfect illegal decentralized mar-
kets. On the Silk Road there is a mechanism in place where
only 2.2% of the transactions are fraudulent. There appears
to be honesty among illegal drug dealers. The Silk Road
marketplace is an independent marketplace where buyers
and seller conduct in electronic commerce transactions. Us-
ing TOR technology the Silk Road also provides anonymity
for its users. Items are payed with bitcoins. Most items
being sold on the Silk Road are illegal narcotics such as
Weed, Drugs, Cannabis, Cocaine and Pills where most of
the items come from the U.S.A. (43,86%), U.K. (10.14%)
and the Netherlands (6,51%). The items are delivered world-
wide. Interestingly the transaction volume stays about the
same while the bitcoin price changed. The number of sellers
doubled almost in 6 months time from February to august
2012. Most of the new sellers leave the site fairly quickly.
Only about 4% of the sellers have been on the site for the
entire duration of the measurements in 2012. Because of the
illegal items that are being sold on the Silk Road some of
the the Silk Road got eventually taken down by law enforce-
ment. [9] [58]
Between september 2013 and january 2015 new versions of
the Silk Road emerged like Agora, BMR, Evolution, Hydra,
Pandora and the Silk Road 2. Some were also taken down by
law enforcement after some time. The total volume through
these illegal markets remains roughly the same despite the
interference of law enforcement. Also the fractions of sales
per item category also remained the same throughout the
period. Sellers simply made new aliases at different market-
places. The total number of vendors increased when mar-
ketplaces were introduced and decreased again when mar-
ketplaces were taken down. It appears that the sales of
illegal items is independent of what marketplace is used and
interference by law enforcement. [58]
Figure 4: Increasing size of BlockChain [43]
2.4 Trust in P2P file sharing
BitTorrent is a P2P file sharing system. It has a mecha-
nism in place to measure the trustworthiness of users and
to prevent free-riding behavior where users only download
files from the system that is inspired on Tit-for-Tat. A peer
in BitTorrent prefers to upload more data to another peer
it has downloaded from. Uploading to another peer thus
increases the trustworthiness of that peer. In Kazaa a more
complicated mechanism is in place where some peers are
elected super nodes and peers receive peer-points for up-
loads. Super nodes get more responses of peers who spend
their peer-points to gain a higher download speed.[60] [10]
[37]
At Delft University of Technology a dedicated blockchain is
operating for creating trust. Two trust schemes have been
tested in Tribler: Bartercast and Multichain. Tribler is a
P2P file sharing system used for research. In BarterCast,
a peer collects upload and download speeds of other peers
by requesting this information from peers. The informa-
tion received is then forwarded to ten other peers. By this
way upload/download ratio information is shared among all
peers and a map of peers with their ratios can be created.
A bloom filter algorithm is in place that deletes duplicate
information. Each peer can calculate the reputation values
of other peers with the max-flow algorithm. In BarterCast
there is no global reputation value calculated by an author-
ity. Every peer maintains its own list of reputations of other
peers. It is assumed that no cheating is done upon the shar-
ing of information. Truth-telling of nodes is assumed and the
trustworthiness of nodes is assumed to be high. It is easy to
attack BarterCast by simply stating a high upload amount
to other users. Sybils can verify this high upload amount to
help fool honest nodes (Meulpolder,M. et al, 2009). [39] [38]
MultiChain is an improvement on BarterCast. A payment
system is introduced that replaces BarterCast completely.
The payment protocol and datastructure is inspired by the
BlockChain payment technology. In both MultiChain and
in BlockChain a chain of blocks with transactions is main-
tained to prevent the double-spending of coins. The dif-
ference between BlockChain and MultiChain is that Mul-
tiChain blocks are distributed among the two peers of the
interaction instead of one single BlockChain. The benefit
of this is that the ChainSize is kept small in MultiChain.
In BlockChain the size of the chain is ever increasing and
becomes a inoperable after some time. But MultiChain also
introduces some of its own problems. When a node fails
MultiChain cannot check anymore for double spending. The
coin could be traded by the failing node and the failing node
is the only node that knows where the coin goes next. Also
transactions cannot be performed fast after each other. A
transaction has to be processed completely in a block be-
fore a new transaction can be made. This gives scalability
problems (Norberhuis, S., 2015). [43] [42] [5]
Tribler also uses decentralized credit mining to gain trust
in other P2P file sharing networks. The system aims to
earn trustworthiness of peers in other swarms. In the pa-
per by Capota et al (2015)[41] this is described as earning
credit in other swarms on behalf of the user. The system is
part of the Tribler P2P client and is implemented for every
peer and therefore completely decentralized. The system
selects swarms on its upload potential and start to upload
data to these swarms. In this way the peer gains trust in
that swarm. Information is frequently updated to maximise
upload to swarms and there are also spam detection and du-
plicate content detection to further enhance the upload pro-
cess. The system is also tested to show that trust is gained
in other swarms with the system. The underlying mecha-
nism to gain trust in the paper is simple. The peers simply
behave cooperatively by uploading data to proof that they
are not free riders and thus to proof their trustworthiness.
2.5 Ethereum: Smart contracts
With smart contracts people are able to execute trades through
Trustless public ledgers (TPLs). TPLs allow a restructur-
ing of power relations between parties and intermediaries.
TPLs enable parties to store digital assets on-line without
the need of banking intermediary who charges a fee. In
addition to that they also allow parties to transfer digital
assets directly to each other on their own terms. The con-
ditions of the terms can be programmed in a ”smart con-
tract”: ”an automated program that transfers digital assets
with BlockChain technology upon certain triggering condi-
tions”. Smart contracts do not require an institution as an
intermediary exchange. Smart contracts also solve the long-
standing problem of e-commerce courts to refuse to protect
consumer contract terms. With smart contracts consumers
can express their own wishes for the contractual terms and
negotiate with other parties on their own (Fairfield, 2014).
[20]
A practical implementation of smart contracts is the Ethereum
system. Money is traded with smart contracts using its own
currency: ”Ether”. The underlying transactions of the smart
contracts are done with BlockChain Technology. BlockChain
does not only provide an infrastructure for digital payments,
but also provides a distributed consensus for the rightness of
the payments and prevents double spending attacks. Ethereum
is a fully fledged Turing-complete programming language
that can create a wide range of financial applications like
smart contracts, digital currencies for exchange and also pro-
grammable decentralized autonomous organizations which
are organizations where the money management of an orga-
nization is completely on the trustless public ledger(DAOs).
[8] [65] [13]
Paper contracts could be replaced by Ethereum contracts.
Paper contracts are an agreement between parties to do or
not do something. For instance, a grain seller agrees on
Figure 5: Purchase with Smart Contract [16]
delivering an amount of grains to the Paranagua harbor in
Brazil at a certain date and time. With Ethereum it is possi-
ble to handle the contract details on-line in the BlockChain.
Egbertsen et al, (2016) [16] explains four fields of examples
where Ethereum smart contracts could replace paper con-
tracts. The first and probably the most widely used is a
purchase agreement. In the current world money is put in
Escrow at a third party upon a purchase. When both sides
have fulfilled their parts, the purchase agreement is met and
the money can be transferred. The third party can be ruled
out with Smart Contracts. The other examples proposed
by Egbertsen et al, 2016 are the certification of diploma’s
in the BlockChain, electronic voting and residential lease
agreements. The Leonardo da Vinci Engineering School in
Paris wants to issue their diploma’s with smart contracts.
Ukrainian officials are taking Ethereum serious as a voting
system. The lease agreements could be stored on Ethereum
to prevent altering of the contract. [6] [36] [30]
3. 15 YEARS OF ACADEMIC FANTASY DE-
SIGNS
The academic world has been somewhat disconnected from
operational systems. Creating an experimental operational
markets is difficult for academic institutions and merely ob-
taining detailed datasets is already problematic. This ham-
pers the progress of the field in our opinion.
3.1 Trust enforcements in P2P file sharing
According to Moreton, T. (2003) [61] the major problem in
P2P systems is the mutual distrust between peers. There
are many pseudonyms or Sybil nodes that take up resources
without providing resources to the network. These Sybils
are run by agents which have a bad trust relationship with
the other agents of the network. The behaviour of these
agents is in P2P filesharing also denoted as freeriding. The
problem was first described by Wilcox O’Hearn (2002) [7]
after his experiences with the deployment of the Mojo Na-
tion file sharing system. O’Hearn also describes the mistrust
among nodes as the biggest problem in Mojo Nation system.
The motivation between nodes to cooperate was not there.
Nodes did not upload data to the network which made data
availability a problem. There were even attacks on the net-
work by which users altered their clients to gain more ad-
vantage for himself. Users altered their clients to gain more
trust in the system.
Tsuen-Wan et al (2003) [63] proposed three solutions to the
free-riding problem and to enforce sharing. Two of them
are not suitable according to the authors. The third one in-
troduces a method that involves the auditing of peer nodes.
Each node maintains a usage file where it defines the amount
of capacity it advertises and it also maintains the advertised
capacities of all neighbours. A simple rule is added that says
that a node can only download new data if its own advertised
capacity is larger than the sum of the advertised capacity of
all its neighbors. An auditing procedure is introduced that
let nodes check on each other whether to tell whether they
are trustworthy or not. The economics of the auditing model
seems very unlikely to be successful. The required capacity
needs to be very high to be able to download data. What’s
interesting about the paper is that the concept of an audit-
ing procedure by other peers is introduced. By this way the
network maintains its own reputation.
Vishnumurthy, V. (2003) [62] introduces a design of a P2P
file sharing system where a currency is introduced in where
a single value called KARMA. The currency KARMA rep-
resents the amount of resources a peer has contributed and
consumed in the network. This represents a users trust-
worthiness with regard to upload/download ratio within the
system. The idea behind is that a user who has uploaded
more is more likely to upload in the future and is therefore
more trustworthy. This means other users can upload to this
user and the user with high KARMA gets a higher down-
load speed. The proposal of Vishnumurty is quite complex.
There are groups of k nodes called bank-sets that keep track
of the KARMA of each user. Mechanisms are in place to
make the KARMA system work. Distributed hash tables
(DHT’s) map nodes towards a bank set. When a node goes
down, a new node becomes part of the bank set. It is im-
possible for nodes to adjust their KARMA level at will and
KARMA can compensate bank nodes for participating in
transactions with KARMA. Thus nodes who help in main-
taining the system by banking get a small KARMA reward.
There are also security mechanisms for replay attacks, mali-
cious providers, malicious consumers, attacks against DHT
routing, corrupt bank sets and denial of service attacks.
However, KARMA does not protect against Sybil attacks.
Protection against Sybil attacks will be discussed in a later
section.
A paper that tries to capture the essence of the combi-
nation of a reputation system and a payment protocol as
with KARMA is the stamp trading model by Moreton et
al (2003). [61] Stamps are introduced that can be traded
between nodes and can later redeemed at a node for service.
In this payment protocol the stamps have a variable value
and are traded based on this value. It is assumed there is a
centralized exchange rate mechanism which can observe all
interactions between node and thus provide perfect valua-
tions to the stamps’ value. This assumption has practical
issues. In the first place it is hard to observe all interac-
tions between nodes and secondly the centralized exchange
rate node has to be trusted fully. If this central nodes gets
compromised by an adversary, all interactions can be ob-
served and the whole network is compromised. In the paper
multiple price valuation methods are proposed with different
Figure 6: Karma-File exchange proposal from
2003[62]
properties. The schemes have to be both token-compatible
and trust-compatible. A scheme is token-compatible if the
total value of the stamps in the network is bounded. A
scheme is trust-compatible if failure by a node to redeem
a stamp never increases the total value of its stamps. In
four of the proposed methods for pricing the system can be
flooded with requests by nodes with a higher bandwidth to
artificially obtain a higher trust. In the last method called
Bounded Redemption Rate (BRR) the value of the stamp is
chosen in such a way that flooding the network with stamps
causes a node’s total stamp value to approach zero value.
In this way the BRR method becomes trust-compatible. It
is also proven that BRR is also token-compatible. BRR can
resist Sybil attacks because when a nodes becomes flooded
with requests of pseudonyms, the total stamp value of a
node approaches zero. However, stamp trading still has the
following open problems: double spending, cryptographi-
cally signing stamps, audit trails of stamps, the token ex-
change problem which is now fixed with the central node as-
sumption and limited knowledge on both the stamp-trading
economies and attacks. Thus although stamp trading is re-
sistant against some form of Sybil attacks it has many open
problems which makes is impractical to implement in the
real world.
PPay is a system introduced by Yang, B. et al (2003) [4]
that uses payment systems to fix the mutual distrust be-
tween peers. The solution Ppay is introduced in this paper
and improves performance of micropayments while main-
taining security. Unlike traditional transferable cash, coins
in Ppay do not grow in size as they are transferred. A user
purchases digital coins from a broker B. The user U is now
the owner of the coin. U can assign the coin to another user
V and V can do reassignment request to U. When V wants
to reassign the coin to user X it has to go through the user
of the coin U. Therefore U must always be online in order
to reassign coins. To solve the problem of a potential crash
of U there is a downtime protocol introduced that allows
the holder of the coin to have the coin reassigned by the
broker. In this case broker B will charge both U and V a
Figure 7: Stamp Trading Protocol from 2003 [61]
percentage of the reassigned amount for this service. This
charging gives incentives for nodes to remain online. The
reassigning of the coin is computationally expensive. Ppay
does not prevent coin fraud at the outset, but instead makes
fraud unprofitable. Ppay ensures that any fraud can be de-
tected and traced back to the misbehaving peer by means
of an aˆA˘IJaudit trailaˆA˘I˙ of the coin. The system can be at-
tacked by replicating an assigned coin and spending it twice,
wrongful denial and double spending. The broker will cre-
ate the right punishments and will do risk management for
the system. There 4 four issues and extensions described to
solve certain problems. 1) Printing raw coins is expensive
for the broker. This responsibility can be divided to users
with limit certifications. 2) Layered coins: The coin trans-
fer history is saved in layers at each coin. The reassignment
adds a new layer to the coin. 3) Coin renewal: The audit
trail is purged once in a while to limit the amount of state
each peer should maintain. 4) Soft Credit Windows: Quick
payments that go back and forth can be washed out. Pay-
word hash chains are also a fast method. A quantitative
analysis is performed that compares Ppay to RM. Ppay can
significantly outperform existing schemes in terms of broker
load, while maintaining a reasonable peer load.
Ham, M. and Agha, G. (2005) [27] solve the trust problem
in a similar way as with micro-payments with servers. The
payment (credit) is made volatile and the approach does not
rely on servers. It is assumed that a stricter system does
not degrade its popularity because a system with free riders
will eventually starve. Four types of cheating are targeted:
Exaggerated credit by an individual peer, Conspiracy: a
peer may evade detection using collaborators, Blame Trans-
fer: a cheater might blame an innocent peer to hide mali-
cious peer misbehavior, Omitting Interested Peers: Omit-
ting peers from malicious lists send to other peers. A credit
system is introduced where credit is the uploaded bytes (con-
tribution) minus the downloaded bytes (consumption). Two
values LL and LLe are introduced as limits to the system
as to when a peer should serve another peer. These limits
solve the start-up deadlock and the starvation.
Feldman, M. et al (2004) [21] made a mathematical model
that studies the trust problem. The mathematical model
has not been tested in the real world so nothing can be said
about its validity. However, some useful observations can
be extracted from the model. For instance, the behaviour of
white-washers: users who leave the system and rejoin with
new identities to avoid reputation penalties are added to the
model. In the paper is not a new incentive scheme proposed.
This is an example of a Sybil attack where pseudonyms leave
the system and later rejoin to renew download speed. Sybil
attacks are discussed later.
70% of Gnutella participants are free riders. e.a. Users
that don’t contribute to the system and are not trustwor-
thy. With a lot of free riders the system does no longer
provide utility to any of it’s participants. The welfare of the
system decreases to zero with a lot of free riders. A P2P con-
tract is formulated by Ghosal et al, 2005 [26] where a peer
contributes an amount of resources R to the system in ex-
change for some level of service S. There are other schemes
to tackle the peer incentive problem. The first relies on al-
truism, this has worked for various systems such as Napster,
Gnutella en Free net. However, they operate sub-optimally
from the standpoint of maximizing the welfare of its partici-
pants. The second approach uses micropayments to provide
economic incentives for resource contributions. In systems
where the currency can be redeemed for goods outside of the
system the problem of free riders does not exist because free
riders have incentives to contribute.
3.2 Trust enforcements in TOR
Free riding users with no trust are also a problem in anonymiza-
tion networks that depend on a very small set of nodes that
volunteer their bandwidth. In order to incentive bandwidth
sharing Androulaki, E. (2008) [19] proposes a design where
payment systems are used that addresses problems such as
the double spending problem with a hybrid payment scheme
by combining features from the micropayment system and
the e-cash scheme. The proposed scheme does not attempt
to achieve absolute financial security but the authors are
willing to accept small amounts of cheating. There are two
types of coins in the proposal: S-coins and A-coins. S-coins
are coins signed by relay nodes and are used to pay succes-
sor nodes in a circuit. A-coins are signed by the bank and
bought by users to use the anonymization network. S-coins
can also be used to pay for using the anonymous network.
This gives economic incentives for tor relays to forward traf-
fic.
The system proposed by Ghosh,M, 2014 [35] makes use of
two systems: TorCoin and Torpath. The TorPath proto-
col assigns Tor circuits to clients, replacing the usual Tor
directory servers with assignment servers which form decen-
tralized consensus groups. In TorPath no client can generate
its own circuit and no client can know the circuit of another
client. The TorPath protocol has three stages: 1) Group Ini-
tialization: Assignment servers let clients connect to them
and the assignment servers form consensus groups of the
clients. Each relay chooses its position in the TOR circuit
(Entry, Middle, Exit). For every position the client is asked
to generate multiple public keys to potentially participate in
multiple circuits on this position. 2) Verifiable Shuffle: The
keys are shuffeled among different circuits to prevent the
Figure 8: Hybrid payment scheme by Androulaki,
E. (2008) [19]
Figure 9: High level TorCoin and TorPath architec-
ture [35]
possibility to link keys to relays or clients. 3) Path Lookup:
The client obtains the IP address of the entry relay and each
relay obtains the IP address of its neighbouring relay in the
circuit. The IP addresses are encrypted with the private
key of each relay. Also, each circuit in the concensus group
obtains a unique circuit identifier. The TorPath protocol
ensures anonymity and circuit diversity. With TorCoin a
protocol is proposed in which every relay in the tor circuits
may mine a limit number of TorCoins as a reward for their
contribution to the network. The mining of torcoins is initi-
ated by the client: every m messages send by the client the
client starts the protocol to mine new torcoins. The clients
have to be checked whether they indeed only mine new coins
after m messages. The authors say this is monitored by the
assignment servers but no clear explanation is given of how
this happens. If clients collude with each other this can give
a security threat. When half of the tor relays are owned by
an adversary 1/16 of assigned circuits will be owned by the
adversary.
In another research by Dingledine, R. et al (2010) [14] a solu-
tion is presented in which a ’gold star’ is given to relays that
provide good services for others. A gold star relay’s traffic is
given higher priority by other relays. The bandwidth is au-
dited by the existing directory authorities to give users gold
stars. After experimentation it is shown that nodes who are
cooperative and thus share bandwidth and forward all gold-
star traffic according to the rules have a faster download
time and lower ping time. No practical implementation is
given where it is tested whether users are indeed willing to
contribute in exchange for a better service.
Another such a system is the TEARS system proposed by
Rob Jansen et al (2010) [52] and the BRAIDS system by
Jansen, R. et al (2010) [53]. In the TEARS system are
Band-with contributions rewarded with Shallots. Users can
exchange Shallots for PriorityPasses to gain traffic priority.
Shallots can be traded with other users. Open problems
are with making incentives to participate, market economics
policies, community effects and with deployment. Also the
problem to determine if a relay was honest or not is not
solved. BRAIDS introduces a ticket system which users can
obtain from a bank and can be embedded into Tor cells to
request services. The tickets are distributed by agent nodes
that monitor other nodes. The agent nodes distribute tickets
from the bank in proportion to the provided bandwidth.
Each relay verifies itaˆA˘Z´s tickets to prevent double spending.
A discrete event based simulator is used to show that their
is an increased performance in traffic. With both TEARS
and BRAIDS no implementation to test the system is given.
A more complex solution to the free riding problem in TOR
networks is the LIRA system proposed by Jansen, R. (2010)
[51]. LIRA produces incentives with a novel cryptographic
lottery design together with a new circuit scheduling algo-
rithm that prioritizes traffic from those winning the lottery.
Relays acquire electronic coins from the bank by provid-
ing service to the network. These coins can be exchanged
for guaranteed winning tickets in the lottery and therefore
provide in prioritized traffic in the TOR network. Other
clients can also guess winning tickets with tune-able prob-
ability. Relays cannot distinguish from a guessed winner
and a payed winner and thus maintain anonymity for pay-
ing clients. Mathematical arguments are given that LIRA
provides economic incentives to buy tor usage, however no
experiments are given in which LIRA is in use and there is
a good working economy.
3.3 Decentralized market design
In 1996 Chavez and Maes propose the Kasbah agent based
marketplace for buying and selling goods. A selling agent is
anonymous, once it is put into the marketplace it negotiates
on its own on behalf of the user. The user adds parameters
to the agent like the desired date to sell an item, desired
price and lowest acceptable price. The goal of the agent
is to sell the item for the highest possible price. Once an
agent has negotiated upon a deal the user can give final
approval. At the same time their are buyers agents for which
users also can set the following parameters: desired price,
highest acceptable price and date to buy the item. The
marketplace allows agents to interact with each other where
all agents speak the same common language. The strategy
of the buying and selling agents would be to first try to
negotiate on the desired price. If this does not work, the
agents will decrease or increase the price until a bargain
is struck. Kasbah is a simple prototype to test the basic
Figure 10: Avalanche value chain from tree to desk
[48]
concepts. At the time of building Kasbah a truly useful
system has yet to be made. [2]
AVALANCHE is a prototype of an agent-based secure elec-
tronic commerce marketplace environment introduced by
Padovan, B. et al in 2001. It is more advanced than Kas-
bah, it contains a reputation system. The authors envisage
an Internet information ecosystem where billions of agent
software systems interact with each other and humans to
exchange a variety of information goods and services. The
reputation of an agent is described as the amount of trust
that is inspired by a particular person or agent inside the
trading setting. By analyzing an agents previous coopera-
tion behavior, the reputation and thus the trust of that agent
is determined. In AVALANCHE agents communicate with
a-symmetric public key encryption with each other to ensure
confidentiality. However, the authentication of the agents is
not guaranteed. It cannot be said whether an agent is a
pseudonym or a real human. This problem is described as
the Sybil-attack which is the most common attack to repu-
tation systems. The strategies of the agents used differ from
KASBAH in the sense that reputations of other agents are
taken into consideration. Also at the end of a transaction
the reputation of the other agent is changed accordingly to
the success of the transaction. [48]
Soska, K. et al (2014) [59] introduces a formal model for a
decentralized anonymous marketplace (DAM), and the de-
sign of Beaver, a Sybil resistant DAM. The transactions and
reviews of items in the marketplace are public, the rela-
tionship between the transaction and reviews are kept pri-
vate and the customers in Beaver always remain anonymous.
There are four basic transactions in Beaver 1) Registration:
a vendor adds an item to the list of available items. 2)
Payment: Funds are moved from a customer to a vendor. 3)
Review: leave a review for an item. 4) Add transaction: add
transcation to ledger. The ledger is a log of all the trans-
actions which is maintained with bitcoin technology. The
vendors first register themselves to the network, a customer
can browse the different vendors and purchase an item from
a vendor by doing an anonymous payment transaction. A
customer can also give a review by tighting a review to a
payment transaction he made earlier. In the security thread
model are two assumptions made: 1) 75% of the nodes in
the network need to be honest. 2) The customers and ven-
dors are rational and do not behave maliciously if the cost of
doing so is significant. Maybe say something about assump-
tions. For each transaction is a detailed algorithm described
to perform the action. Fees are paid for each transaction
and obtained by the node that adds the transaction to the
ledger with bitcoin technology. Some limitations and points
for future work are discussed like: vendor privacy(vendors
might want to conceal their transaction volume) and values
of fees.
4. SYBIL ATTACKS
In a Sybil attack users create zero-cost identities to collude
together and cheat the system. Lian, Q. et al, (2007) [49]
measures user collusion activity in a real-world P2P system,
Maze, that is fully controlled by the authors of the paper.
Maze has a point system where peers consume points on
downloading and gain points on uploading. A number of
collusion detectors are identified: 1) Repetition-based collu-
sion detection: Colluders generate large amounts of upload
traffic with repeated content to generate points. The dupli-
cation degree is defined as the ratio of total upload traffic
in bytes over the size of the unique data in bytes. When
taking a look at the top 6 peers with the highest duplication
degree it seems that the peers are colluding. The highest
duplication degree of a peer is 43. The fact that the top
4 peers all generated duplicate traffic during the same days
gives very strong evidence that the peers are colluding. 2)
Group-based collusion detection: Groups of peers exchang-
ing traffic to each other to generate points. It is possible for
two friends to share large amounts of mutually interesting
content. However, if these uploads to each other are rela-
tively high comparing to their total traffic this is indicative
for collusion. 3) Spam account collusion: One account is the
main account which will get high points. Other pseudonym
spam accounts are created with zero cost that will down-
load from the main account to generate points for the main
account. 4) Upload traffic concentration: If a lot of upload
traffic from one peer is targeted towards a single physical
machine this is a sign of collusion. The traffic concentration
is measured: the ratio of a peers highest upload traffic to a
single machine to his total upload traffic. The Venn diagram
shows that the collusion detectors sometimes mark the same
peers as colluders. The detectors show empirical evidence
that colluding behavior is happening in real world systems.
It is yet not possible to provide definitive proof of the intent
to collude.
In order to be protected against the Sybil attack in reputa-
tion systems for the trustworthiness of websites algorithms
have been proposed by researchers. Hopcroft and Shel-
don introduced the Global Hitting Time Mechanism (GHT)
score in 2007 that is an improvement on the PageRank trust
mechanism. [29] In PageRank, the trustworthiness is based
on multiple factors, but the most important factors are the
number of links directing towards that website and the trust-
worthiness of a website that is referring. It is based on the
principle that if more trustworthy people link toward a web-
site, this website should be trustworthy. Pseudonyms can re-
fer to each other to become trustworthy and these trustwor-
thy pseudonyms can then increase the trust of certain web-
sites by linking towards them. This is called the ”two-loop
Figure 11: Comparing different collusion detec-
tors[49]
attack”. GHT differs from PageRank in that the links outgo-
ing from the website of which the GHT score is determined
are removed from the PageRank calculations. This protects
against the two-loop attack. However GHT is still vulnera-
ble to the restart-capture attack. The restart-capture attack
make use of a vulnerability in the GHT algorithm when the
calculation restarts at a different node. Thus Brandon, L.
(2016) proposes a new algorithm called Personalized Hitting
Time to solve this problem and improve the GHT algorithm.
PHT works almost the same as GHT but calculates the score
with a minor adjusted random walk. With an experiment is
shown that PHT gives resistance against a specific kind of
attack when agents show strategic behavior. Strategic be-
havior means that more sybils can be created by an agent.
Also the informativeness of PHT remains high when more
Sybils are added. But this property also remains high with
Personalized PageRank. The definition of strategic behav-
ior among agent is that a strategic agent creates misreports
for other agents. Thus the agent will slander other agents
with misreports. In PageRank this is equal to cutting out-
links to other pages or in other words to not create links
to other pages. The strategic behavior is changed and re-
defined for every type of trust algorithm. In the PHT ver-
sion no Sybils are added. The title of the paper: ”Personal-
ized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite
Sybils” suggests that PHT provides an improvement on the
trust mechanisms with Sybils. However, in the paper the
strategic behavior of agents do not add any Sybils. Thus
the impact of Sybils is not tested on PHT. [33] [32] [15]
The lack of good algorithms to calculate trust scores with
Sybils gave inspiration to Otte, P. to research Sybil-resistant
trust mechanisms. Otte, P. introduces Temporal Page Rank,
another random walk variant that makes use of a random
jump in the random walk. An experiment in Tribler shows
that a higher uploaded amount of data (trustworthiness)
leads to a higher downloaded amount and thus that a fair
trust mechanism is in place. However, there is no a strong
guarantee against Sybil attacks. Another algorithm that is
introduced by Otte, P. is the NetFlow algorithm that makes
use of the Max-Flow algorithm of Ford-Folkerson to calcu-
late a trust score. The informativeness is the percentage of
agents that have a non zero reputation score. In NetFlow
only agents with positive reputation scores will be granted
resources. Some agents or new agents does not have up-
loaded enough resources in relation to their downloaded re-
sources to have a positive reputation score which leads to
low informativeness. To solve this a scaling of upload re-
sources in comparison to download resources is implemented
to generate a higher trust score among agents. This will al-
low weakly profitable Sybil attacks and is a trade-off with
informativeness. [47]
5. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS IN TWO-SIDED
MARKETS
A ”two sided market” is a market where two parties are
linked together. For instance, a credit-card links consumers
and merchants to each other or newspapers link subscribers
to advertisers. The software platforms that bring together
these groups of users are considered a very important inno-
vation and can be found in many industries. Agents that
operate in a two-sided market can develop strategies to ex-
ploit weaknesses in the market. [18] [3]
In 1962 Gale and Shapley introduced the first matching
model in two sided markets. A preference list is a ranked
list where the agent gives a preferred order of all the agent it
wants to be matched with. For instance, a grain buyer pro-
vides an ordered ranked list of all the grain sellers it wants to
buy from. With the deferred acceptance algorithm a ”stable”
match can be found. A ”stable” match is a matching of all
the buyers and sellers such that they can never do a better
matching when re-matching each other later. The algorithm
works as follows. Each buyer proposes to match itself to its
preferred seller. A seller who receives multiple proposals
from buyers chooses greedily the favourite buyer and rejects
all other buyers. In the next stages each rejected buyer now
proposes to their next choice and again sellers choose their
most preferred option or reject otherwise. Gale and Shapley
prove that this algorithm always lead to a stable matching.
The deferred acceptance algorithm is a greedy algorithm be-
cause it makes the local optimal choice at each stage. [23]
There are multiple ways in which matching can occur in
two sided markets. In One-to-One matching there is one
buyer matched to one seller like in the Gale and Shapley
model of 1962. The matching mechanism is strategy-proof
if truth-telling upon preference revelation in the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm is a dominant strategy equilibrium when
analyzing with game theory. According to Roth (1982) [54]
there exists no matching algorithm that is both stable and
strategy-proof for one-to-one matching problems. However,
in the One-To-One case the proposing side (buyers) have
truth-telling as a dominant strategy. Thus a stable match-
ing is compatible with truth-telling for one side of the mar-
ket. Another interesting thing is that Gale & Sotomayor
(1985) [24] showed that any stable matching in the One-to-
One case is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.
An undominated strategy in game theory is a strategy where
the outcome could be better or worse than another strategy
depending on what other players do. This means that in
the market case the side that receives matching proposals
might be better off with another strategy than truth-telling
depending on what the proposing side (buyers) do. [1]
In Many-to-One matching multiple identities are matched
to a single identity. For example, multiple students are
matched to one college. Gale and Shapley already men-
tioned the college admissions type of problem and proposed
an alternative deferred acceptance algorithm which proves
to provide a stable matching. Also for this type of problem
Roth showed in 1982 that there exists no mechanism that is
stable and strategy-proof. [54] Roth also shows in 1986 that
truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for all students
under the student-optimal stable mechanism. For colleges
that is different. There exists no stable mechanism where
truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for all colleges.
[55] The student to college matching mechanism was used by
the Boston School Committee because the original system
would incentivize to ”game the system”. It enables fami-
lies to list their true choices of schools without jeopardizing
their chances of being assigned to any school by doing so.
The Boston School example shows that the two sided mar-
ket theory is successfully implemented in the real world.[1]
[56]
6. CONCLUSIONS
Building a decentralized market requires a trust system that
tell peers the trustworthiness of other peers. Building these
trust systems proofs to be a challenging problem because
there are various solutions both in academic designs and
real world implementations each with their own problems. A
wide used solution is building a reputation system that gives
users an indication of the trustworthiness of other users.
Most reputation systems in both the academic literature and
real world implementations meet their trust related design
requirement but are not defended against the Sybil attack.
In the Sybil attack fake identities are created by an adver-
sary to manipulate the trust scores of users. It is shown
that it is impossible to completely defend reputation sys-
tems against the Sybil attack, but there is ongoing research
to make reputation systems more resilient against the Sybil
attack. Another proposed solution for a trust mechanism is
the use of smart contracts where people can transfer money
via a trustless public ledger with programmable contract de-
tails. Smart contracts should eventually be able to replace
paper contracts. Another challenge in decentralized markets
is the problem of users being able to use strategies to manip-
ulate the market. This can prevented with a good matching
engine.
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